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Education: Teachers' Rights
By KEITH GRAHAM HANLEY* AND ROBERT G. SCHWEMM**
INTRODUCTION
Tenure occupies an important place in the mind of any
new teacher. During the past survey year, the Kentucky courts
have demonstrated that this status is not only important to
teachers generally; it is essential to continued job security. The
aegis of tenure provides not only the substance of teachers'
rights but also the procedure used to protect those rights.
Discharged teachers have alleged violations of the 14th
amendment of the U.S. Constitution in both its equal protec-
tion' and due process aspects' and violations of the Kentucky
constitution.3 However, in each instance the courts have sum-
marily dismissed these claims, preferring instead to confirm
the legislative tenure scheme as a judicial touchstone and a
teacher's sole shield.
This article will survey the past year's developments in the
Kentucky case law concerning: (1) statutory due process for
tenured-teachers and administrators;4 (2) the status of non-
tenured teachers;5 and (3) employee unionization in an educa-
tion context.'
I. STATUTORY DUE PROCESS FOR TENURED TEACHERS
A. Background on Continuing Service Contracts
Upon being hired for a fifth year of teaching in a school
district, a certified teacher receives a statutorily-mandated
"continuing service contract."7 Such a teacher thereby ac-
* J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky College of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1967, Amherst Col-
lege; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
I Belcher v. Gish, 555 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1977).
2 Blackburn v. Board of Ed. of Breckinridge County, 564 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. App.
1978).
Belcher v. Gish, 555 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1977).
See Section I infra.
See Section II infra.
See Section I infra.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 161.740 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS] reads, in part:
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quires what is commonly known as tenure. Once the teacher
achieves this status, his or her contract is renewed on a year-
to-year basis as a matter of course unless cause for nonrenewal
is demonstrated in accordance with a specific procedure.8 The
statute requires that the teacher receive in writing notice of: (1)
the board's intent not to rehire; (2) the charge which precipi-
tated the decision; and (3) the date and place at which the
teacher may appear to contest these charges.' Further, the stat-
ute permits only, certain types of charges to constitute cause
for discharge."0
The teacher has ten days from the receipt of written notice
to notify the board of his or her intention to appear and contest
the charges." If the teacher does not comply with this require-
ment, the board may consider the right to appear as waived
and proceed unilaterally to terminate the teacher's employ-
ment. 2
If the teacher decides to answer the charges, witnesses may
(1) Teachers eligible for continuing service status in any school district
shall be those teachers who meet qualifications listed in this section:
(a) Hold a standard or college certificate as defined in KRS
161.720;
(b) When a currently employed teacher is recommended for
reemployment after teaching four (4) consecutive years in the same
district, or after teaching four (4) years which shall fall within a
period not to exceed six (6) years in the same district, the year of
present employment included, the superintendent shall recom-
mend said teacher for a continuing contract, and, if the teacher is
employed by the board of education, a written continuing contract
shall be issued ....
KRS § 161.790(1) (1971) provides: "The contract of a teacher shall remain in
force. . . and shall not be terminated except for any of the following causes. .. .
9 KRS § 161.790(3) (1971). '
to (a) Insubordination, including but not limited to 1. violations of
lawful rules and regulations established by the local board of education for
the operation of schools, and 2. refusal to recognize or obey the authority of
the superintendent, principal, or any other supervisory personnel of the
board in the performance of their duties;
(b) Immoral character or conduct unbecoming a teacher;
(c) Physical or mental disability;
(d) Inefficiency, incompetency or neglect of duty, when a written state-
ment identifying the problems or difficulties has been furnished the teacher
or teachers involved.
KRS § 161.790(1) (1971).
" KRS § 161.790(3) (1971).
12 Id.
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be subpoenaed for both sides, sworn under oath, and their testi-
mony received and recorded.' 3 In addition, both the teacher
and the board may be represented at the hearing by an attor-
ney." Should the board vote not to rehire the teacher, the
teacher may appeal to circuit court within thirty days for a de
novo hearing.'5 Decisions of the circuit court may be appealed
pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure; 6 it is this higher level
of review which provides the setting for the following cases
decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court and Court of Ap-
peals.
B. Specificity of Charges and Documentation
The Court of Appeals decided two cases in the last two
years in which specificity and documentation of charges
against a tenured teacher comprised the main issue. In the
first, Blackburn v. Board of Education of Breckinridge
County, ' 7 the appellant teacher received timely notice of the
board's intention not to rehire him, along ith five reasons for
its action. The Court of Appeals' opinion did not recite the
exact charges, but implied that all were couched in general
terms and parroted the reasons enumerated in Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes § 161.790 as just cause for dismissal. The court
relied on earlier decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court
which held that bare conclusory characterizations (such as the
terms used in the statute) do not give a teacher sufficient notice
to permit formulation of a reasonable defense.'" The court par-
ticularly criticized the use of the terms "inefficiency" and
13 KRS § 161.790(4) (1971).
" Id.
Is KRS § 161.790(6) (1971).
" Id.
17 564 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. App. 1978).
Is Id. at 36-37.
It is well settled in Kentucky that in a termination proceeding under KRS
161.790, the giving of mere notice of a general grounds for termination is not
sufficient to inform a teacher of the specific nature of the charges against
him, so as to permit the preparation of an adequate defense. . . . Knox
County Board of Education v. Willis, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 952 (1966); Osborne
v. Bullitt County Board of Education, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 607 (1967) and




"incompetency" without reference to specific "names, dates,
[or] occurrences . . ." as being "not in sufficient detail to
satisfy the statutory requirements . *..."Is Further, the opin-
ion noted that the lack of specificity was inexcusable, since
detailed information was available to the superintendent be-
fore the board initially gave the teacher notice of nonrenewal
of his contract."0
The school administration also failed to give Blackburn
any written indication that his job performance was unsatisfac-
tory at the time of the defective performance. Failure to give
contemporaneous written notice rendered impossible any dis-
missal for incompetency or inefficiency, even though the Court
expressed little doubt that Blackburn was incompetent, since
at the hearing "he was unable to remember his birthdate, could
not recall the names of ten of his students and was unable to
explain elementary aspects of certain terms."2' This demand
for contemporaneous communication of deficiencies serves an
important prophylactic purpose by providing protection
against stale charges and an opportunity to mend unacceptable
ways; the court therefore concluded that compliance with the
requirement was a prerequisite to dismissal.
Finally, the court observed that the statute required the
board to produce written records of teacher performance. The
court found that this requirement was not satisfied by the in-
troduction of a single evaluation written only three weeks be-
fore the teacher was given notice of the board's decision not to
rehire him after his ninth year of teaching. However, this poor
timing of evaluations might not be decisive where, for instance,
previous written evaluations were satisfactory and the charge
arose out of an acute incident, or series of incidents, rather than
a chronic condition such as general incompetency or ineffi-
ciency.1
2




n The Court noted in its opinion that many of these procedural problems could
have been avoided if local legal counsel had "been engaged to advise the Board of
Education at the inception of the problems which ultimately led to the termination of
the teacher. The failure to obtain legal counsel early is false economy." Id.
[Vol. 67
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Mavis v. Board of Education of Owensboro3 where the Court
of Appeals held that a teacher was properly dismissed for inflic-
tion of physical and psychological punishment on students.
Here, the teacher did not object to any lack of specificity in the
charges at the time of the initial hearing; the charges were
supported by written evaluations and complaints from parents;
and Mavis had previously been ordered to cease the use of
corporal punishment and had been transferred to another
school for just that reason. The potential existence of two justi-
fications for the discharge caused the court to consider whether
the Board needed to announce a specific finding on each
charge. Since both charges were supported by the evidence, the
court's comment serves primarily as a warning to school boards
in more questionable cases. "We think better procedure would
indicate a need for a finding by the Board, but it is not required
by statute. . . .A different holding might become necessary
if several charges are preferred and the evidence supports some
of the charges but not the others. '2 4 The implication is clear
that even complete compliance with the statute might not sat-
isfy due process requirements in certain situations. As a result,
Mavis stands alone among recent Kentucky appellate decisions
in its implication that KRS § 161.790 fails to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process in some cases.
C. Procedural Due Process Challenges to the Board Hearing
Mechanism
During the past survey year, Kentucky's Court of Appeals
turned down several due process challenges to the statutory
procedure for terminating the contracts of tenured teachers. In
four of these cases,2 the dismissed teacher challenged the fair-
ness of the initial hearing where "the school board is cast into
and occupies the roles of employer, investigator, accusor, pros-
ecutor, jury and judge" 2 and the form of subsequent review by
563 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. App. 1977).
' Id. at 739.
Blackburn v. Board of Ed. of Breckinridge County, 564 S.W.2d 35 (Ky. App.
1978); Mavis v. Board of Ed. of Owensboro Independent School Dist., 563 S.W.2d 738
(Ky. App. 1977); Kelly v. Board of Ed. of Monticello Independent School Dist., 566
S.W.2d 165 (Ky. App. 1977); Burkett v. Board of Ed. of Pulaski County, 558 S.W.2d
626 (Ky. App. 1977).
" Burkett v. Board of Ed. of Pulaski County, 558 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. App. 1977).
1978-79]
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the circuit court. Each case presented a different attack on this
process, yet none succeeded.
In Kelly v. Board of Education of Monticello Independent
School District, 27 the teacher had been given proper and timely
notice of the board's intention to terminate his contract due to
alcohol, drug, and psychiatric problems and their effect on his
teaching. At the hearing, Kelly's counsel conducted a voir dire
examination of the board members regarding their opinion as
to the truth of the charges. While every member indicated that
he had some pre-existing belief in the truth of the charges, each
refused to disqualify himself. Proof was offered and the board
found Kelly "physically and mentally unable to perform the
duties of a full-time teacher." 8 Kelly appealed his dismissal to
circuit court.
In the circuit court proceeding, the judge permitted the
board to introduce additional medical evidence, although the
judge reserved the right to either later exclude the evidence
from consideration or allow Kelly the opportunity to gather and
introduce repudiatory evidence. The deposition of a psychia-
trist who had examined Kelly on an earlier occasion was admit-
ted on behalf of the board, but Kelly declined to offer any
additional evidence on his own behalf. The circuit court af-
firmed the board's decision, and Kelly appealed once again.
Before the Court of Appeals, Kelly argued that procedural
due process required not only that he receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard but also "that he have the right to have
those charges initially tried before an impartial tribunal or
decision maker. '2 9 Kelly essentially challenged the constitu-
tionality of the entire statutory framework for removal, since
the statute specified that the initial tribunal is to be the board
itself rather than an appointed hearing officer or other
"removed" party. Certainly the additional expense, loss of ex-
pertise, and inherent delay in the use of "removed" tribunals
make such an alternative undesirable as a practical matter.
However, the Court of Appeals did not reach these pragmatic
considerations, deciding instead that "the opportunity for a de
7 566 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. App. 1977).
nId. at 167.
" Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 67
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novo hearing at the circuit court level with the right to offer
additional evidence, if so desired, was intended by the legisla-
ture to cure any deficiencies in the due process hearing at the
Board level." 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on
a portion of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Hortonville Joint School District No. 1. v. Hortonville Educa-
tional Association for the proposition that in an educational
context:
[m]ere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an
agency in the performance of its statutory role does not, how-
ever, disqualify a decision maker . . . . Nor is a decision
maker disqualified simply because he has taken a position,
even in public, on a policy issue related to the disputein the
absence of a showing that he is not "capable of judging a
particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circum-
stances."
31
However, Hortonville involved group disciplinary action
against striking teachers, more a policy than an adjudicatory
decision. The U.S. Supreme Court noted: "The Board's deci-
sion was only incidentally a disciplinary decision; it had signifi-
cant governmental and public policy dimensions as well.
'32
Despite this significant distinction, the Court of Appeals relied
heavily on Hortonville in cases in addition to Kelly, citing
Hortonville to turn aside procedural due process attacks on
board hearings that were adjudicatory of individual teacher's
rights rather than decisions of policy.
The court in Kelly also relied heavily on the de novo circuit
court proceeding as a cleansing mechanism for any due process
infringements occurring during the board hearing. But the
court's opinion itself is contradictory in a crucial element in
this analysis: viz., the scope of a teacher's right to introduce
new evidence at the circuit court level. At one point in the
opinion, the court stated "that the opportunity for a de novo
hearing at the circuit court level with the right to offer addi-
tional evidence. . . was intended by the legislature to cure any
*4 Id. at 168.
31 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976) (quoting from United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,
421 (1941)).
32 Id. at 495.
1978-79]
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deficiencies in the due process hearing at the Board level."
Such an unfettered right would guarantee a truly de novo hear-
ing. But if the teacher indeed has such a right, it is not clear
that the circuit court has a corresponding duty to admit and
consider this additional evidence. In fact, the circuit court re-
lies on the transcript of the board's hearing and "such addi-
tional hearings as it [the court] may deem advisable, at which
it may consider other evidence in addition to such transcript
and record. ' 34 The court in Kelly recognized this judicial dis-
cretion and seemed to contradict its earlier statement by not-
ing "that it was the manifest intention of the legislature that
either side have an opportunity to present additional evidence
at the de novo hearing, if the circuit court deems it advisa-
ble." 5
If indeed this judicial discretion suprecedes any right to
present additional evidence at a de novo hearing, then the
review of the board's decision by the circuit court seems to lack
any substantial meaningful purpose, particularly in view of the
already significant limitations on such review. The circuit
court "cannot inquire into the motives of the Board and cannot
say that the testimony of one witness should be believed rather
than that of another;" 6 nor can it "choose between conflicting
testimony on which the school board has the right to base its
decision."
3 7
The Kelly court relied on the opinion of this state's highest
court in Bell v. Board of Education of McCreary County s to
establish that teacher dismissal hearings before the school
board are intended only to establish a record which can later
be examined for arbitrariness. However, the appellant in Bell
was a dismissed superintendent who was found by the Court
to have no right to a board hearing. Thus his gratuitous hearing
before the Board was immune from due process attack, beyond
an examination for arbitrariness. 39 Where teachers are in-
- 566 S.W.2d at 168 (emphasis added).
KRS § 161.790(6) (1971) (emphasis added).
566 S.W.2d at 169 (emphasis added).
3 Bell v. Board of Ed. of McCreary County, 450 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Ky. 1970)
(quoting from Hoskins v. Keen, 350 S.W.2d 467, 469 (1961)).
37 Id.
31 450 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1970).
31 Id. at 231.
[Vol. 67
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volved, however, as in Kelly, this logic breaks down, since
teachers are statutorily guaranteed a hearing as a matter of
right." As a result, due process scrutiny of a teacher dismissal
hearing should go beyond the issue of simple arbitrariness
treated in Bell; reliance by the Kelly court on the Bell decision
seems improper from a constitutional perspective.
The Court of Appeals has refused to reverse circuit court
decisions on teacher dismissals except when the circuit court's
findings were "clearly erroneous."41 In recent cases the appel-
late courts have approved: tremendous lower court deference to
a school board's decision regarding conflicting testimony; 2 a
decision to dismiss a teacher made after voir dire demonstrated
that the school board members lacked impartiality in the mat-
ter;43 a decision made without public deliberation" and unsup-
ported by specific findings of fact; 5 and denial of an absolute
right of teachers to submit evidence at the circuit court level.46
Under such circumstances, it seems doubtful that the statutory
mechanism for dismissals satisfies the procedural due process
requirements outlined by the United States Supreme Court in
the Hortonville case, which has been quite frequently relied on
by the Kentucky courts to justify their actions.
In Hortonville, the Supreme Court held that the proce-
dural due process rights of teachers were not violated when the
school board dismissed the teachers after an extended strike
against the school board.47 The Court found that the school
board's dual function of bringing disciplinary charges as well
as conducting the disciplinary hearing was not a sufficient indi-
cation of bias or prejudice to invalidate the dismissals on con-
" KRS § 161.790(3), (4) (1971).
" See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
42 Kelly v. Board of Ed. of Monticello Independent School Dist., 566 S.W.2d 165
(Ky. App. 1977).
3 Bell v. Board of Ed. of Harlan Independent School Dist., 557 S.W.2d 433, 435
(Ky. App. 1977).
" Id. at 434; Mavis v. Board of Ed. of Owensboro Independent School Dist., 563
S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. App. 1977).
"See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra. Further, in Bell, the court explicitly
held that a circuit judge "may, but is not required to, conduct a further hearing." 557
S.W.2d 433, 434 (Ky. App. 1977).
"Burkett v. Board of Ed. of Pulaski County, 558 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Ky. App. 1977).




stitutional grounds.4" However, the situation before the Court
in Hortonville differed significantly from the disciplinary pro-
ceedings usually reviewed by the Kentucky courts in that dis-
puted issues of fact must often be resolved by Kentucky school
boards, while the significant facts were undisputed in
Hortonville.49 When the board performs an adjudicatory func-
tion by making determinations on disputed issues of fact, the
potential bias of the board must be scrutinized far more
closely. The Hortonville Court repeatedly emphasized that
the absence of any board fact-finding was an important compo-
nent of its decision." As a result, the terminations recently
reviewed by the Kentucky courts were different from the
Hortonville situation in at least one essential respect and there-
fore should be more closely scrutinized for indications of school
board partiality.
This additional scrutiny of board biases and prejudices is
necessary to prevent enforcement of unfair decisions which
cannot be cured by judicial review. Since the circuit judge
accepts board conclusions as to disputed testimony and the
appellate courts will reverse only for clear error,52 meaningful
judicial review can be thwarted by the bias of the initial
decision-maker (the board). Perhaps for this reason the Court
of Appeals in Kelly ignored the earlier Kentucky Supreme
Court decision in Board of Education of Pulaski County v.
Burkett.5" Burkett, in turn, was based on the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Withrow v. Larkin,54 which
held that the "additional and sufficient blankets of protection"
provided by judicial review could cure certain procedural due
process deficiencies.5
However, in Withrow, an administrative body made a de-
termination involving individual property rights only after an
, Id. at 496.
, Id. at 489.
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
" 426 U.S. at 424.
1" Kelly v. Board of Ed. of Monticello Independent School Dist., 566 S.W.2d 165
(Ky. App. 1977).
525 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1975).
421 U.S. 35 (1975).
525 S.W.2d at 747.
[Vol. 67
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investigation and adversary hearing." On the other hand, in
Kelly and similar challenges, the board held an adversary hear-
ing only after it had made the decision to terminate. The differ-
ence between a hearing before a decision and one after a deci-
sion is important; in fact, the Supreme Court in a footnote to
Withrow distinguished its own earlier decisions which had
found due process violations on this basis. "Each held that
when review of an initial decision is mandated, the decision-
maker must be other than the one who made the decision under
review." 7 At present, the board does not fulfill this reviewing
function, since the board first terminates the contract and then
itself conducts a hearing concerning the termination. Nor does
the circuit court seem to fulfill this function when introduction
of evidence is not by right, and the court must give conflicting
testimony received at the board hearing the same interpreta-
tion given it by the board.
Correction of this possible deficiency may not be simple.
Isolating the board from any investigation prior to giving notice
of termination is counterproductive, as discussed earlier. Fur-
ther, the statute treats the board's determination as a
"decision"; the teacher's dismissal is inevitable if he or she
does not contest the charges, and any notice after receipt of the
superintendent's recommendation is at the board's discretion.
A better solution to the constitutional problem would result
from permitting the circuit court to examine the board's deci-
sion regarding conflicting testimony. Certainly, the courts do
not wish to become a super school board reviewing every per-
sonnel matter. Nevertheless, to assure procedural due process
protection of a teacher's vested property rights, the courts
should interpret the statutory scheme in a manner that takes
full advantage of the circuit court's position as an impartial
decision maker.
IX. NON-TENURED TEACHERS' RIGHTS
Twice during a teacher's career he or she will lack the
protections of tenure: (1) during the first four years of teaching
" 421 U.S. at 57-58.
" Id. at 58 n.25.
1978-79]
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in a particular system;58 and (2) upon being rehired for a teach-
ing year after reaching age sixty-five.59 A non-tenured teacher
has only a limited contract with the school board. In contrast
to a teacher with a continuing service contract, a teacher with
a limited contract has no right to a dismissal hearing and, as
the Kentucky Supreme Court made quite clear this year, the
reasons for dismissal given a non-tenured teacher may be very
broad and general.
In Tucker v. Miller,60 the Court clearly indicated that a
non-tenured teacher had no protection beyond the notice re-
quirements of the statute. Tucker was given timely notice of
the board's decision not to rehire her for the next year. At her
request, the superintendent informed her that the reasons for
the board's decision were her "inability to work well with the
students, inadequate relationships with other faculty mem-
bers, poor community relations and an inability to carry out
instructions of the principal."'" Tucker contended that these
cited deficiencies were vague and did not meet the statutory
requirement of "specific reason or reasons""2 for the discharge
of a non-tenured teacher and therefore her dismissal was in-
valid due to lack of proper notice. While this general statement
of reasons for dismissal would probably not have sufficed as
proper notice to a tenured teacher, the Court held that in the
case of a non-tenured teacher neither due process nor the stat-
utes required specificity, since a teacher with a limited con-
tract has no right to a hearing and thus no need for great
specificity in the notice. The statutory requirement of "specific
reason or reasons" serves only to provide the teacher with infor-
mation and need only be sufficient "to permit him to appre-
ciate the circumstances that contributed to the Board's deci-
sion not to reemploy."63
' KRS § 161.750(1) (Supp. 1978).
', KRS § 161.720(4) (Supp. 1978).
' Tucker v. Miller, No. 75-109 (Ky. Jan. 10, 1978) (per curiam).
6 Id. at 2.
12 Prior to a 1976 amendment, KRS § 161.750(2), the governing statute, required
that "upon request by the teacher such written notice shall contain the specific reason
or reasons why the teacher is not being reemployed." The relevant portion of KRS §
161.750(2) (Supp. 1978) now reads: "Upon receipt of a request by-the teacher, the
board shall provide a written statement containing the specific, detailed and complete
statement of grounds upon which the nonrenewal of contract is based."
[Vol. 67
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This broad interpretation of the statutory notice require-
ment seems appropriate when considered in light of the board's
almost complete discretion in granting limited contracts. The
Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed this complete discretion,
citing an earlier Kentucky Supreme Court decision which held
that "cause is not required for denial of reemployment under
a limited contract."" However, the board still must provide
some reason for dismissal to comply with the statute. Certainly
the right to notice cannot be completely disregarded, since it
lays the foundation for the teacher's pursuit of a remedy for any
violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.
In Belcher v. Gish,6" the Kentucky Supreme Court consid-
ered the implications of the termination of tenure at age sixty-
five. The Central City Board of Education had passed a resolu-
tion providing that all teachers had to retire at the end of the
school year in which they reached age sixty-five.A6 The plain-
tiffs' eligibility for continuing service contracts lapsed under
the state statute at the end of the same school year. They were
then eligible only for a limited contract. When the plaintiffs
requested specific reasons for their dismissal, the board simply
reiterated the policy announced in its earlier resolution.
The Court upheld the dismissal, saying that this policy fell
within the general powers granted to the board by statute.67 In
so doing, the Court tacitly accepted the proposition that the
"specific reason or reasons" for a board's decision not to rehire
can be that a teacher falls into a given classification which the
board has determined will not be considered for teaching con-
tracts. If this is the case, then an individual teaching under a
limited contract possesses nothing that can properly be called
a right to continue his employment from year to year. Justice
Jones gave perhaps the best summary of the "new" or
"modem" cases in this area when he stated that at sixty-five
0 No. 75-109 at 3.
" Board of Ed. of Louisville v. Louisville Ed. Ass'n, No. 75-742 (Ky. App. Sept.
30, 1977) (citing Johnson v. Dixon, 501 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. 1973)).
- 555 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1977).
" Id. at 265.
'3 KRS § 160.290(2) (Supp. 1978) gives local boards of education the power to
promulgate rules and regulations for the management of the schools, including the
qualification and employment of teachers. Justice Sternberg dissented on this issue.
555 S.W.2d at 268-69.
1978-79]
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"[the cloak of tenure falls from his [the teacher's] shoulders,
and his reemployment on a yearly basis is dependent on the
grace of the board of education."6
Belcher and a similar case"9 this year also raise the inter-
esting constitutional question of whether the board's policy
decision not to rehire a teacher after his or her sixty-fifth birth-
day violates equal protection and due process. The Court chose
not to address these claims in its opinions, leaving those sub-
stantial issues unanswered. Those issues are explored more
fully elsewhere in this publication.7"
III. UNIONS IN AN EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT
Kentucky's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals each
heard one case this year in which collective bargaining issues
were raised in an educational setting. In Board of Trustees of
the University of Kentucky v. Public Employees Council No.
51, 71 the Supreme Court explored some of the implications and
complications of public employee collective bargaining in edu-
cation. The case arose when representatives of the union ap-
proached the trustees with a "substantial number" of repre-
sentative designation cards signed by nonacademic employees
of the university. The trustees filed a declaratory judgment
action to clarify their rights and duties with respect to bargain-
ing with the union.
The trial court answered most of the general questions
presented by the trustees, and the Supreme Court affirmed its
decision. However, the Court found only one determination to
be crucial-that the employees were public employees not cov-
ered by the statute authorizing union activity7 2 and
"consequently, there is no duty placed by the legislature on the
Board of Trustees to recognize, negotiate or bargain with the
group of nonacademic employees here. ' 73 The Court relied on
," Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
"1 The Supreme Court relied solely on Belcher in its memorandum opinion per
curiam in Pendleton v. Estes, No. 75-958 (Ky. Oct. 28, 1977) (per curiam).
1* Comment, Constitutional Limitations on Mandatory Teacher Retirement, 67
Ky. L.J. 253 (1979).
71 571 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1978).
72 KRS § 336.130 (Supp. 1978).
" 571 S.W.2d at 620.
[Vol. 67
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its earlier decision in Jefferson County Teachers Association v.
Board of Education of Jefferson County74 which held that pub-
lic employees were excluded by the legislature when it gave
employees in general the rights to bargain collectively, picket,
and strike. 75 The Court reiterated that although this exception
was dropped because of oversight in the 1942 revision of the
statutes, the original intent of the legislature to except public
employees was still applicable.
7
The Court recognized, however, that the employees' rights
of freedom of expression and association meant that they had
"a right to join a national labor union and to organize them-
selves to carry out their collective wishes. ' 77 This conclusion
results in a confused state of affairs. If the trustees are under
no duty to recognize or bargain with an agent and the employ-
ees have no right to strike, how can the employees "carry out"
any of their collective wishes more effectively through
organization? 8
71 463 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971).
" KRS § 336.130 (Supp. 1978).
" The Court in Board of Trustees quoted at length from Jefferson County
Teachers:
"In 1940 the legislature enacted the Hunnicutt Act as Chapter 105 of the
Acts of the General Assembly. This Act related to employer-employee rela-
tions, and recognized the right to collectively bargain, strike, picket, etc.
Article V of this Chapter provided specifically that there were exempted
from all of the provisions of the Act .. . employees of the United States,
the State and any and all political subdivisions or agencies thereof." In
Baldwin's February 1941 Supplement to Carroll's Kentucky Statutes this
Act was incorporated as Chapter 42bb. The exemption provision (Article V)
appears as section 1599c-39.
"In 1942 the statutes were completely revised as the Kentucky Revised
Statutes. In the revised statutes, Carroll's Chapter 42bb was incorporated in
KRS Chapters 336, 337 and 338. What had been Carroll's section 1599c-39
(Article V) was compiled in KRS 336.050, 337.010 and 338.010. The exemp-
tion provision was incorporated in KRS 337.010(2), for Chapter 337, relating
to "Wages and Hours", and in KRS 338.010(3), for Chapter 338, relating to
"Safety and Health of Employees", but was not included in KRS 336.050,
nor in any section of Chapter 336.
"The original Act pertaining to employer-employee relations clearly and
expressly excluded public employees from the granted right to strike. The
apparently inadvertent omission of this exclusion in Chapter 336 when the
statutes were revised cannot be held to have changed the legislative policy
and the law. Therefore appellants cannot properly claim the legislature has
granted them such a right, and their principal contention must fall."
571 S.W.2d at 619 (quoting from 463 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. 1970)).
571 S.W.2d at 620 (Ky. 1978).
"The Court addressed this question in broad terms acknowledging that it was
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Nonetheless, the Court recognized the trustees' ability to
negotiate with any group of employees or their representatives.
Justice Stephenson's opinion reasoned that as the trustees had
the power to negotiate employment terms with any individual
employee, "[n]egotiating with two or more employees, or their
chosen representative, cannot logically be held to exceed the
implied authority of the Board."79
Such negotiations, however, are not to be of the type
usually undertaken in the private sector. While the negotia-
tions may lead to an enforceable contract concerning hours,
wages, retirement, or other conditions of employment, the trus-
tees cannot recognize the union representative as an exclusive
representative for any employees other than those who have
authorized the representative to be their agent. The Court
mandated this prohibition because the "power, authority and
duties of the Board [of Trustees] are derived from the statutes
enacted by the General Assembly. . . ."0 KRS § 164.225 pro-
vides that the Board of Trustees shall have "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" over the terms of employment of all its employees. The
Court concluded that any recognition of an exclusive bargain-
ing agent that would prohibit the trustees from negotiations
with independent employees or their separate agent "would be
a clear violation of the statute imposing exclusive jurisdiction,
power and control in the Board with regard to all aspects of
employment.""1
This determination-prohibiting recognition of an exclu-
sive agent-further undercuts the employees' ability to "carry
out" their collective desires. In fact, the union argued that such
an exclusive agent "is a necessary concomitant to any effective
bargaining relationship." 2 It is ironic that the Court found the
trustees' binding themselves contractually to a fixed wage,
hour, or retirement scale did not violate their exclusive control
while binding themselves to a particular exclusive agent would
"delving into theoretical questions in areas where all the implications are not readily
discernible." Id. Further, the Court's statements about what the trustees could do if
they chose may be considered dicta since the trustees stated that they did not wish to
recognize, negotiate, or bargain with the union.






constitute such a violation. In either case, the Board unilater-
ally controls the terms of employment as long as employees
lack the right to strike. It seems as though the Court is actually
protecting only an employee's right to represent himself or
choose his own representative on an individual basis for nego-
tiations, a "protection," in turn, that severely inhibits the
employees' ability to act as a powerful, united group.
It is difficult to determine whether the Court in Board of
Trustees based its decision solely on the explicit legislative
grant of exclusive power to the trustees or on a more general
prohibition against public employee bargaining in the educa-
tional field. However, the Court of Appeals considered a similar
question last year in Board of Education of Louisville v. Louis-
ville Education Association.3 There the local board of educa-
tion and a teachers' association (LEA) "entered into a Profes-
sional Agreement pertaining to wages, hours and working con-
ditions of certificated teachers employed in the system."8 The
agreement contained a grievance procedure as well as a clause
providing that the authority granted by the legislature to the
board for the exclusive control of the school system would not
be limited by the agreement.
A majority of the court held that two teachers with limited
service contracts did not have a grievance within the terms of
the agreement and that simple compliance with the statutory
termination procedure of KRS § 161.7505 would be sufficient,
notwithstanding the Professional Agreement." The court
added that even if termination could be considered a grievance,
the additional steps for termination imposed by the contract
would "alter" the statutory mandate that the board maintain
exclusive control of the school system 7 and would therefore be
void.
The court cited an 1894 Wisconsin case, Gillan v. Board
of Regents of Normal Schools,8 8 which held that dismissal of a
teacher was a right of a board of education which could not be
3 No. 75-742 (Ky. App. Sept. 30, 1977).
u Id. at 1.
u For a discussion of KRS § 161.750, see text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
u No. 75-742 at 3.
See KRS §§ 160.160, .290.
u 58 N.W. 1042 (Wis. 1894).
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limited by contract. Judge Howerton, in his dissent, noted that
Gillan "was undoubtedly a good decision in 1894, but it is so
removed from the facts of life today that it simply must not be
authority for a teacher-school board contract in Kentucky in
1974."89 It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals interpreted
Kentucky's statutes to prohibit a school board from contract-
ing away any of its "exclusive control" or whether the decision
not to rehire simply fell outside of the definition of grievance
in the Professional Agreement. As a result, neither the Court
of Appeals nor the Supreme Court definitively answered the
key question, whether educational collective bargaining is per-
missible under any circumstances.
CONCLUSION
This past survey year saw Kentucky's appellate courts
forego aggressive confrontation of key issues in the area of
teachers' rights. The courts avoided breaking new ground
where age discrimination, due process, and collective bargain-
ing questions were raised. In so doing, the courts refined statu-
tory construction in these areas and then relied almost totally
on their construction of those statutes. The only clear result of
this course of action was a further widening of the gap between
the rights of teachers employed under a limited service con-
tract and those working under a continuing service contract.
11 No. 75-742 at 5.
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